---
title: "What the tape said: current, on tape"
url: https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/current-on-tape.html
publisher: LendRisk Analytics
series: What the Tape Said
issue: 13
published: 2026-09-13
kind: Research brief
description: "Fourteen auto lenders, forty-four securitizations, 1.15 million loans on their latest monthly tapes. Every one of them grants payment extensions, and every extension turns a past-due account current. Reported 60+ delinquency against the same figure with recently extended loans added back, lender by lender, with what happened to those loans six months later. Every figure recomputed from the filed loan-level records; inferences labeled."
html: https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/current-on-tape.html
---

# What the tape said: current, on tape

[← All insights](https://lendriskanalytics.com/articles.html)

What the Tape Said · Issue 13
Research brief · 15 min read

Auto ABS · Regulation AB II loan tapes · Payment extensions

# Current, on tape.

Form ABS-EE loan-level filings, January 2021 to July 2026 · Public record through September 13, 2026 · LendRisk Analytics

Issue 8 walked through how an extension works. The servicer moves a missed payment to the end of the loan, nothing is due next month, and the account reports as current. It also said nobody adds up the field that records this. So I did. Forty-four registered auto securitizations, fourteen lenders, one record per loan per month, 1.15 million loans on the latest tapes. Every one of those lenders grants extensions. Prime captives included. What separates them is how much of the book has been through one, and what the loan does in the six months after.

1,845 bps

What extensions took out of the subprime 60+ number, July 2026

318 bps

Same thing on the prime shelves, on top of a reported 0.73%

42%

Of Exeter loans extended while under 60 days late are 60+ again within six months

6.1×

AmeriCredit's gap against GM Financial's own prime shelf, same servicer, same month

## Bottom line

Here is the whole exercise. Take the July 2026 tape for every registered auto deal I hold, twenty-nine of them. For each loan, read two fields: the days past due the servicer reports, and the number of months the loan was extended that period. Work out 60+ delinquency the way every index does, weighted by balance. Then work it out again with one change. Any loan that is under 60 days late today but got an extension in the last six months gets counted as delinquent. The second number is not a prediction. It is the most the extension mechanism could have taken out of the first.

| Shelf tier, July 2026 tapes | Deals | Loans | Reported 60+ | Adjusted 60+ | Gap | Extended in last 6 months | Extended ever |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prime | 19 | 629,959 | 0.73% | 3.91% | 318 bps | 3.3% | 8.5% |
| Subprime | 10 | 253,145 | 8.10% | 26.55% | 1,845 bps | 21.0% | 45.2% |

Balance-weighted across the deals in each tier. Prime: Ally, CarMax, Carvana, Ford, GM Financial, Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Toyota, Volkswagen, World Omni. Subprime: AmeriCredit, Bridgecrest, Exeter, Santander Drive. "Extended ever" is the share of today's balance sitting in loans that have at least one extension anywhere on the tape. Every number here was rebuilt from the filed EX-102 records before publishing.

On the subprime shelves, one dollar in five of what is outstanding today was extended in the last six months. Nearly half has been extended at some point. The reported delinquency number sits on top of that. The prime shelves run the same mechanism at about a sixth of the scale.

The read
The 60+ number in a servicer report, a rating agency index, or a headline is the count after the servicer has already decided which accounts to reset. On every shelf here, that decision mostly happens before the account ever shows as late. More than nine in ten extensions go to loans fewer than 30 days past due. **This is a piece about follow-through, not concealment.** The field that records the reset is public. The six months after it tell you whether the reset held.

## I · What the field says, and how two ways of filing it nearly hid half the market

[Item 1125 of Regulation AB](https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/229.1125) lists what a registered auto deal has to file about every loan, every month. Item 3(f)(25) is days past due. Item 3(f)(6) is the payment due next period. Item 3(j) only applies "if the loan has been modified from its original terms," and inside it, Item 3(j)(2) asks for "the number of months the loan was extended during the reporting period." Read that phrase twice. It is a per-month entry, not a running total, and it only has to be there when something was modified.

Santander says the reset out loud in its own filing. The [EX-103 narrative](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1383094/000119312526352812/sdart241ex103.xml) attached to Santander Drive 2024-1's July 2026 tape defines the next payment due as the amount needed "for the receivable to be considered current," and then: "If 'next reporting period payment amount due' is reported as 0.00, no interest or principal is due in the next reporting period for the receivable to be considered current because the obligor either made a payment in advance or was granted a payment extension." [Exeter](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2005087/000092963826003306/eart2024-1_exhibit103.xml) and [AmeriCredit](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2020251/000202025126000030/exh103loanv2.xml) file nearly the same sentence.

Issuers fill in Item 3(j)(2) two different ways, and that difference is why this brief looks the way it does. Exeter, AmeriCredit, Santander, GM Financial and Hyundai write the field on every loan every month. Zero when nothing happened, a 1 or a 2 in the month an extension was granted, zero again after. Ally, CarMax, Carvana, Ford, Honda, Nissan, Toyota, Volkswagen, World Omni and Bridgecrest leave the tag out entirely unless something was modified, and fill it in only in that month. Both are fine under the rule. They are not the same to a parser. The desk I built in August looked for an increase over the prior month's value. For the second group there is no prior value, so the increase came out as nothing, and those shelves read as extension-free. The first draft of this piece was going to say prime lenders do not extend. That was wrong and the mistake was mine. The rule that holds up is the plain one: a positive value in the month is an extension in the month.

**Inference**
I am putting the correction in the body rather than a footnote because it is the same lesson as the article. A field can be public, complete, and filed correctly and still read as empty if you assume one filing convention. Anyone building an extension series across issuers has to check how each one writes the field before comparing two of them.

One narrative does not match its tape. Carvana's [EX-103 for CRVNA 2024-P2](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1999671/000199967126000032/crvna24p2ex103.xml) lists Item 3(j)(2) as "No response," yet the filed EX-102 carries values of one to three months on a few hundred loans each period, next to modification type codes. I used the values. Honda's [narrative](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/890975/000119312526361400/harot251ex103_0821-1606.xml) says modification type "4" is an extension and that Item 3(j)(2) can go negative when a prior extension is reversed. AmeriCredit says the same. Negative values were treated as no extension.

## II · Same servicer, two shelves

GM Financial services a prime shelf and the AmeriCredit subprime shelf. It files both with explicit zeros, and it filed July 2026 tapes for both on the same schedule. Whatever is different between the two, it is not the servicer, the filing style, or the month.

Chart 1 · One servicer, two shelves, July 2026

[GM Financial Consumer Automobile Receivables Trust 2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2003007/000200300726000027/0002003007-26-000027-index.htm) and [AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2020251/000202025126000030/0002020251-26-000030-index.htm), July 2026 EX-102 tapes. Balance-weighted 60+ delinquency, as reported and with loans extended in the last six months added back.

GMCAR 2024-1: 23,608 loans outstanding, 4.3% of balance extended in the last six months, 10.9% ever. AMCAR 2024-1: 34,667 loans, 26.5% in the last six months, 56.2% ever. Weighted average origination scores from each deal's first tape: 775 and 587. Six-month redefault after an extension, all live deals on each shelf: 11.0% prime, 18.5% AmeriCredit.

The prime shelf reports 0.55% and reads 4.64% adjusted. The subprime shelf reports 3.86% and reads 28.69%. Reported, the two are seven times apart. Adjusted, six times. So the extension mechanism is not what makes subprime look worse than prime. It is what makes subprime look better than it is. On that shelf, for every dollar reported 60+ there are more than six dollars that were extended in the last six months and are not.

## III · Fifteen lenders, one ledger

Chart 2 · Reported against extension-adjusted 60+ delinquency, by lender

Latest July 2026 tape of every live deal, balance-weighted within lender. Dark bar is reported. The full bar adds back loans extended in the last six months. Subprime shelves in red.

Twenty-nine deals, 883,104 loans, $15.6 billion outstanding. Six-month lookback throughout. Section V shows three and twelve.

| Lender, July 2026 | Deals | Reported 60+ | Adjusted 60+ | Gap, bps | Extended, 6 mo | Extended, ever | 60+ within 6 mo of extension |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exeter | 4 | 9.27% | 34.90% | 2,562 | 30.2% | 53.7% | 41.7% |
| AmeriCredit (GM Financial) | 2 | 3.92% | 26.80% | 2,288 | 24.4% | 58.2% | 18.5% |
| Bridgecrest (DriveTime) | 1 | 11.23% | 29.15% | 1,791 | 22.9% | 41.2% | 42.4% |
| Santander Drive | 3 | 8.75% | 19.91% | 1,117 | 12.3% | 33.3% | 24.0% |
| CarMax | 3 | 1.82% | 6.82% | 500 | 5.3% | 16.0% | 19.6% |
| Ford Credit | 1 | 0.28% | 5.18% | 490 | 5.0% | 9.2% | 5.0% |
| Ally | 3 | 0.97% | 4.81% | 384 | 4.0% | 10.3% | 8.4% |
| GM Financial prime | 2 | 0.46% | 4.05% | 360 | 3.8% | 8.9% | 11.0% |
| Hyundai | 1 | 0.43% | 3.94% | 351 | 3.6% | 8.2% | 6.9% |
| World Omni | 2 | 0.76% | 4.15% | 339 | 3.5% | 8.9% | 7.5% |
| Carvana | 3 | 1.88% | 5.23% | 336 | 3.7% | 11.2% | 23.4% |
| Toyota | 1 | 0.41% | 2.29% | 188 | 1.9% | 4.8% | 10.6% |
| Volkswagen | 1 | 0.32% | 2.10% | 179 | 1.8% | 4.8% | 8.9% |
| Nissan | 1 | 0.09% | 1.42% | 133 | 1.3% | 3.0% | 4.5% |
| Honda | 1 | 0.33% | 1.45% | 112 | 1.2% | 3.7% | 4.1% |

Last column: of loans that were under 60 days late when extended, the share that hit 60+ in the following six months, counted across every live deal on the shelf rather than July's alone. Filing indexes for the July 2026 tapes: [Exeter 2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2005087/000092963826003306/0000929638-26-003306-index.htm), [2025-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2049379/000092963826003311/0000929638-26-003311-index.htm); [AmeriCredit 2023-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1963240/000196324026000029/0001963240-26-000029-index.htm), [2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2020251/000202025126000030/0002020251-26-000030-index.htm); [Bridgecrest 2025-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2050168/000110465926097653/0001104659-26-097653-index.htm); [Santander 2023-6](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1999133/000119312526352810/0001193125-26-352810-index.htm), [2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2004812/000119312526352812/0001193125-26-352812-index.htm), [2025-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2049903/000119312526352849/0001193125-26-352849-index.htm); [CarMax 2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2003263/000200326326000040/0002003263-26-000040-index.htm); [Ford 2025-A](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2057342/000205734226000033/0002057342-26-000033-index.htm); [Ally 2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2010413/000201041326000041/0002010413-26-000041-index.htm); [GM Financial 2024-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2003007/000200300726000027/0002003007-26-000027-index.htm), [2025-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2047316/000204731626000028/0002047316-26-000028-index.htm); [Hyundai 2025-A](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2056104/000110465926099085/0001104659-26-099085-index.htm); [World Omni 2024-A](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2007987/000110465926102655/0001104659-26-102655-index.htm); [Carvana 2024-P2](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1999671/000199967126000032/0001999671-26-000032-index.htm), [2025-P1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2037956/000203795626000032/0002037956-26-000032-index.htm); [Toyota 2025-A](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2047571/000119312526370139/0001193125-26-370139-index.htm); [Volkswagen 2025-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2054483/000110465926098967/0001104659-26-098967-index.htm); [Nissan 2025-A](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2063629/000119312526356412/0001193125-26-356412-index.htm); [Honda 2025-1](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2052479/000119312526361400/0001193125-26-361400-index.htm). Each deal's full filing history is one click further into EDGAR.

Three things in that table that the tier averages hide.

The captives are not at zero. Honda and Nissan are the floor, with roughly 1.1 to 1.3% of balance extended in six months, and even there the adjusted number is four to fifteen times the reported one, because the reported one is so small. Ford reports 0.28% and reads 5.18%. Nobody on this list has an extension policy of none.

CarMax and Carvana sit between the tiers on every column. CarMax reports 1.82% and reads 6.82%. Carvana reports 1.88% and reads 5.23%. Their six-month redefault rates, 19.6% and 23.4%, are closer to Santander's 24.0% than to any captive's. An average score in the low 700s got these pools a prime label. It did not get them a prime cure rate.

The subprime shelves do not agree with each other. Santander's gap is 1,117 basis points on 12.3% of balance extended in six months. Exeter's is 2,562 on 30.2%. Bridgecrest, in the registered market for the first time with its [2025-1 trust](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2050168/000110465926097653/0001104659-26-097653-index.htm), reports the highest raw delinquency of the fifteen at 11.23% and still carries a 1,791 point gap on top of it. Exeter is where the extension is closest to the norm. On its [2022-1 trust](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1907570/000092963826003295/0000929638-26-003295-index.htm), 75% of the balance still outstanding has been extended at least once.

**Inference**
Rating agencies build tier indices from these same filings. The Fitch subprime 60+ index for the first quarter of 2026, covered in [an earlier note](https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/q1-2026-dpd.html), was 6.90%. The reported figures here run higher because these ten shelves lean deep. The adjusted figures say something else: the index and the reported number share a denominator that has already been cleaned. Neither is wrong. Both are after the reset.

## IV · What happens in the six months after

The adjusted number is a ceiling, and it needs to be said that way every time. Not every extended loan would have gone 60+. The measurement that turns the ceiling into an estimate is the one the [Philadelphia Fed](https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/FRBP/Assets/Consumer-Finance/Reports/cfi-report-april-2026-do-recent-auto-loan-delinquency-rates-overstate-borrower-distress.pdf) said in April was the open question. Its report found that "while the stock of severe auto delinquencies is rising, the flow of new delinquencies into this stage is fairly stable," that the share of subprime loans getting an extension "reached approximately 3.5 percent last year," and offered this: "If extensions temporarily return borrowers to current status, but many borrowers subsequently fall behind again, the result is a cycle that keeps loans in the delinquent population longer." Its data are bureau tradelines, which cannot see the extension. The tapes can.

So take every extension granted on the forty-four live deals to a loan that was under 60 days late at the time, with at least six more months of tape to watch. That is 513,907 of them. Ask two things of each. Did the loan hit 60+ in the next six months. Was it charged off.

| Extensions granted while under 60 DPD | Events | 60+ within 6 months | Charged off within 6 months | Granted while already 30+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prime shelves | 156,405 | 13.4% | 3.4% | 0.8% |
| Subprime shelves | 357,502 | 29.2% | 8.5% | 6.1% |

Event-weighted across the 31 prime and 13 subprime live deals. Charge-off is zero balance code 4 inside the window. The last column is the share of all extensions that went to a loan already 30 or more days late when it was extended.

On the prime shelves, seven in eight extended loans do not reach 60+ inside six months. That is what a hardship tool doing its job looks like. On the subprime shelves it is seven in ten. On Exeter and Bridgecrest it is under six in ten: 41.7% and 42.4% of extended loans are 60+ again within six months, and 12% to 15% are charged off in the same window. On those shelves an extension is, more often than anywhere else in the table, a loss that has been pushed down the road.

The last column changes how you should read the reported number. On every shelf, extensions overwhelmingly go to loans that have not yet shown as 30 days late. 99.2% of prime extensions, 93.9% of subprime ones. Exeter is the outlier at 10.1% granted to loans already 30+. So the reset does not mostly pull accounts out of the delinquency buckets. It mostly keeps them from ever going in. That is why the flow of new delinquencies can look flat while the adjusted stock climbs, which is exactly the shape the Philadelphia Fed found in the bureau data and could not explain from it.

**Inference**
Multiply the ceiling by the redefault rate and the subprime gap of 1,845 points comes out to roughly 540 points of deterioration that was real and deferred, on top of the 8.10% reported. Same arithmetic on prime is about 40 points on 0.73%. Treat those as order-of-magnitude figures, not a second index. They assume the six-month redefault rate is the right conversion, and Section V is where that assumption gets tested.

## V · Why six months, and what three or twelve would say

The lookback is a choice. A loan extended two years ago and current today is not being masked. A loan extended last month is. I picked six months before running the numbers. Here is what the other two obvious choices give you, same tapes, same month.

| Gap, reported to adjusted 60+, July 2026 | 3-month lookback | 6-month | 12-month |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prime shelves | 179 bps | 318 bps | 591 bps |
| Subprime shelves | 1,057 bps | 1,845 bps | 3,105 bps |
| Exeter 2024-1 | 1,646 bps | 2,728 bps | 4,085 bps |
| AmeriCredit 2024-1 | 1,390 bps | 2,483 bps | 4,021 bps |
| Santander 2024-1 | 616 bps | 1,105 bps | 2,137 bps |
| GM Financial 2024-1 | 211 bps | 409 bps | 715 bps |
| CarMax 2024-1 | 395 bps | 725 bps | 1,369 bps |

The order of the lenders is the same under all three. The ratio between tiers is 5.9x at three months, 5.8x at six, 5.3x at twelve.

The choice moves the level. It does not move the ranking. That is the property you want from a convention. The six-month redefault window in Section IV is matched to the six-month lookback on purpose. A loan the extension held for six months is a loan the six-month adjustment should stop counting.

## VI · Where the record goes dark

Everything above comes from registered deals, because only registered deals file Form ABS-EE. Private 144A placements do not. Search EDGAR's full-text index for ABS-EE filings by shelf and the [Tricolor](https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/#/q=%22Tricolor%22&forms=ABS-EE) trusts return nothing. Neither do CPS, Westlake, GLS, Flagship or First Investors. Tricolor failed in September 2025 and its loan tapes were never public. The lenders most likely to run a heavy extension book are, by how the market is built, the ones this method cannot see. Bridgecrest is the exception that makes the point. DriveTime's DT Auto trusts were 144A. Its 2025 Bridgecrest trust is the first tape from that book anyone outside the deal has been able to read.

**Inference**
The registered subprime market here is four lenders. If you want the extension rate for subprime auto as an asset class, you do not have it, and without a change in what 144A issuers disclose you will not get it. What the four do show is enough to say the practice is universal inside the tier, and that what happens after it is the number that tells the lenders apart.

## VII · What this does not show

Five things, so nobody has to find them for me.

1

**The adjusted number is an upper bound, and it is presented as one.** It counts every recently extended loan as if it would have been delinquent. Section IV gives the rate at which that held over six months. Anyone quoting 26.55% as a delinquency rate has misread this.

2

**Securitized pools are a slice of each lender's book, not the book.** Loans that charged off or paid before the cutoff never show up, and a deal ends at its clean-up call. The comparisons are like-for-like across pools. None of them is a statement about the lender's whole portfolio.

3

**Pool age differs.** A 2025 deal has had fewer months for extensions to pile up than a 2022 deal. That is why "extended ever" rises with age, and why the lender table weights across each shelf's live deals rather than picking one. The six-month column is the age-neutral one.

4

**An extension is not misconduct.** Every issuer discloses that the field resets the amount due, several describe their limits, and Issue 8 covered the disclosure failure that does get punished. This piece measures a mechanism the rules allow. What it argues is that the number after the mechanism should not be read as the number before it.

5

**Four registered subprime lenders are not the subprime market.** Section VI is the reason. Stretching the tier figures to cover the 144A issuers would be a guess, and I am not making it.

Falsifiable
This fails if the same construction run on the July 2027 tapes shows the subprime shelves' six-month redefault share at or below the prime shelves', or the subprime gap between reported and adjusted 60+ under 1,000 basis points at a six-month lookback. Both tests are mechanical, the fields are named above, and every filing is linked. **Anyone with the tapes can run it.**

## Proof: every figure, traced

Every figure was rebuilt from the filed EX-102 asset data files for this publication, after the correction in Section I. Recomputed means the number was rebuilt from the loan-level records and matched. Derived means calculated from recomputed figures, arithmetic shown. Verified means read straight from the cited public document.

| Claim as stated | Source | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Item 3(j) applies "if the loan has been modified"; Item 3(j)(2) is "the number of months the loan was extended during the reporting period"; Item 3(f)(6) is the next period payment due; Item 3(f)(25) is days past due | 17 CFR 229.1125, Item 3 ; element name paymentExtendedNumber per the SEC ABS XML technical specification | Verified |
| Santander: a next payment due of 0.00 means the receivable is considered current because the obligor "either made a payment in advance or was granted a payment extension" | SDART 2024-1 EX-103 , July 2026 filing, Item 3(f)(6); same language in Exeter and AmeriCredit | Verified |
| Carvana narrative lists Item 3(j)(2) as "No response"; Honda and AmeriCredit describe negative values as reversals; Honda uses modification type 4 for extensions | CRVNA 2024-P2 EX-103 , HAROT 2025-1 EX-103 , AMCAR 2024-1 EX-103 | Verified |
| Two filing conventions: explicit zeros every month (Exeter, AmeriCredit, Santander, GM Financial, Hyundai) versus tag omitted unless modified (the other ten); values are 1 to 2 in the grant month and 0 or absent after | Population share of Item 3(j)(2) across every row of every panel: 100% for the first group, 0.1% to 2.9% for the second; loan-level sequences inspected on EART 2024-1, AMCAR 2024-1, SDART 2024-1, GMCAR 2024-1, HART 2025-A | Recomputed |
| Universe: 44 live deals from 14 lenders, 1,148,856 loans on their latest tapes; 29 deals with a July 2026 tape, 883,104 loans, $15.56B outstanding; four deals excluded for mid-life filing gaps (AMCAR 2022-1, EART 2021-1, GMCAR 2022-1, WOSAT 2023-A) | EX-102 files fetched from each trust's EDGAR filing list, e.g. Exeter 2024-1 ; de-duplicated on asset number and period end because servicers re-file amended tapes | Recomputed |
| Tier figures, July 2026: prime 19 deals, 629,959 loans, 0.732% reported, 3.914% adjusted, 318 bps, 3.32% extended in six months, 8.5% ever; subprime 10 deals, 253,145 loans, 8.101%, 26.546%, 1,845 bps, 21.00%, 45.2% | Balance-weighted on reportingPeriodActualEndBalanceAmount; 60+ from currentDelinquencyStatus; extension events from paymentExtendedNumber > 0 | Recomputed |
| Lender table, all fifteen rows | Same construction, balance-weighted across each lender's July 2026 deals; deal-level values in the working file | Recomputed |
| GMCAR 2024-1: 0.55% reported, 4.64% adjusted, 409 bps, 23,608 loans, 4.3% / 10.9% extended, WA score 775. AMCAR 2024-1: 3.86%, 28.69%, 2,483 bps, 34,667 loans, 26.5% / 56.2%, WA score 587 | GMCAR 2024-1 July 2026 ABS-EE ; AMCAR 2024-1 July 2026 ABS-EE ; scores from each deal's first tape, balance-weighted | Recomputed |
| 6.1x: AmeriCredit's gap against the prime shelf | 2,483 / 409 = 6.07 | Derived |
| Redefault: 156,405 prime events, 13.4% 60+ and 3.4% charged off within six months, 0.8% granted at 30+; 357,502 subprime events, 29.2%, 8.5%, 6.1%; Exeter 41.7%, Bridgecrest 42.4%, Carvana 23.4%, CarMax 19.6%, Santander 24.0%, AmeriCredit 18.5%, GM Financial prime 11.0% | Events are periods with paymentExtendedNumber > 0 on a loan under 60 DPD with six further tapes available; outcome is any subsequent currentDelinquencyStatus ≥ 60, or zeroBalanceCode 4, within six periods | Recomputed |
| Roughly 540 bps and 40 bps of deferred deterioration | 1,845 × 0.292 = 539; 318 × 0.134 = 43 | Derived |
| Lookback table: prime 179 / 318 / 591; subprime 1,057 / 1,845 / 3,105; the five named deals as printed; tier ratios 5.9x / 5.8x / 5.3x | Same July tapes, lookback windows of 3, 6 and 12 periods | Recomputed |
| Exeter 2022-1: 75% of outstanding balance extended at least once | EART 2022-1 July 2026 ABS-EE ; 75.3% of end balance in loans with any positive paymentExtendedNumber on the tape | Recomputed |
| Philadelphia Fed: stock rising while flow stable; approximately 3.5% of subprime loans extended last year; the redefault hypothesis; bureau tradeline data | Cheney, Hunt, Lambie-Hanson, Santucci and Zhou, April 2026 , Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Consumer Finance Institute; data are the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax auto tradelines | Verified |
| Fitch subprime 60+ index 6.90%, Q1 2026 | LendRisk note on the Q1 2026 print | Verified |
| No ABS-EE filings for Tricolor, CPS, Westlake, GLS, Flagship or First Investors; Bridgecrest 2025-1 is registered | EDGAR full-text search, form ABS-EE , run per shelf name; BLAST 2025-1 July 2026 ABS-EE | Verified |

**Sources & notes**
**Data.** Form ABS-EE, exhibit EX-102 asset data files, for forty-four registered auto loan trusts, monthly from each deal's first tape through the July 2026 period end, fetched from EDGAR by trust CIK. Fields used: assetNumber, reportingPeriodActualEndBalanceAmount, currentDelinquencyStatus, paymentExtendedNumber, zeroBalanceCode, obligorCreditScore. Amended tapes de-duplicated on asset number and period end. Deals with a gap in the monthly sequence excluded.

**Method.** Delinquency is balance-weighted throughout, matching the rating agency indices. An extension event is a positive paymentExtendedNumber in a period. Adjusted delinquency adds to the 60+ balance every loan under 60 days past due that had an event in the trailing lookback window, six months unless stated. Redefault follows each event on a loan under 60 days past due for six further periods. Tier membership follows each shelf's prospectus positioning; CarMax, Carvana and World Omni are counted prime.

**Correction.** The desk built in August detected extensions as an increase over the prior month's value, which found nothing for issuers who leave the tag out unless a modification occurred. The rule was replaced before any figure in this brief was computed. The earlier read was never published.

**Companion issues.** [Issue 8](https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/current-on-paper.html) covers the extension mechanism, the Car-Mart non-reliance finding and the COVID extension surge. [Issue 12](https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/the-lot-behind-the-branch.html) covers the credit union filing line that reads the loss after the reset.

Where this brief goes beyond what the filings state, it is labeled as an inference. Point-in-time reading of public filings through September 13, 2026. LendRisk Analytics is an independent research publication with no position in, and no affiliation with, any institution mentioned. This is not investment, legal or accounting advice.

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Related

[Issue 8 Current, on paper.](https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/current-on-paper.html)
[Issue 12 The lot behind the branch.](https://lendriskanalytics.com/insights/the-lot-behind-the-branch.html)