--- title: "Sample Walkthrough" url: https://lendriskanalytics.com/sample-report.html publisher: LendRisk Analytics published: 2026-04-30 kind: Page description: "A worked example on a synthetic $40M subprime auto book. It shows how to find the slope the aggregate hides, attribute it to three dealers, date it by vintage, and project the covenant breach. Illustrative analysis on made-up data, not a real portfolio." html: https://lendriskanalytics.com/sample-report.html --- # Sample Walkthrough Data report · synthetic composite This is a model data report, written the way the analysis usually unfolds. Numbers drawn from a synthetic 2,000-loan demo book. Names and identifying details are invented. How they lend: [**Indirect lender** Dealer attribution](https://lendriskanalytics.com/sample-report.html) [**Direct lender** Borrower segments](https://lendriskanalytics.com/sample-report-direct.html) LendRisk Analytics · Worked Example · Synthetic Data # How to read a subprime book. A worked example on a synthetic composite book · Every figure is illustrative **Prepared**  LendRisk Analytics **Date**  May 2026 **As-of**  April 30, 2026 **Loans**  2,000 **Line size**  $40M senior warehouse Worked example · Synthetic 2,000 Active loans $32.4M Originated balance 9.6% NCO · annualised 4.2% 90+ DPD 574 WA FICO How to read this This is a worked example: one synthetic book read the same way a warehouse bank's surveillance team eventually reads it, except **caught early, while there is still time to act.** It is here to show what the analysis looks like, nothing more. One synthetic book run through five tools: the dashboard, the dealer scorecard, the vintage static pool, the vehicle-to-term matcher, and the covenant projector. Read it top to bottom. It moves from "this book looks fine" to the exact dealers, the exact month, and the three moves that keep the line open. 01 · We open the tape On paper, you look completely fine. Tool · Portfolio Dashboard Walking the book Start with the headline numbers, the same five at the top of this page. Net charge-offs running **9.6% annualised**, 90+ delinquency at **4.2%**, weighted FICO **574**. The NCO covenant cap is 13.5%. So today the book sits almost four full points under its cap. If we stopped right here, you would feel fine. Your bank would feel fine on the snapshot. The note would end here. Most reviews stop here, which is exactly why most problems are found by the lender's bank instead of the lender. *A book is a movie, not a photograph.* The number that matters isn't where you are. It's how fast you're moving, and in which direction. 02 · The slope, not the snapshot Watch the column nobody puts on the dashboard. Tool · Covenant Projector · trend read What I'm pointing at Look at the "Monthly Δ" column. Your NCO is not parked at 9.6%, it is climbing **0.65 points every month**. Your 90+ DPD is climbing 0.30. The level is comfortable. The trajectory is not. That slope is a straight line I fit through your last six months of readings. Carry it forward and the comfortable gap to your cap closes faster than anyone in the room expects. | Metric | Current | Monthly Δ | Covenant cap | Headroom | Status | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | NCO (annualised) | 9.60% | +0.65 pp | 13.50% | 3.90 pp | ⚠ 6 months | | 90+ DPD | 4.20% | +0.30 pp | 6.00% | 1.80 pp | ⚠ 6 months | | WA FICO | 574 | −1.2 / mo | 560 floor | 14 pts | ✓ Watch | | 60+ DPD | 7.10% | +0.40 pp | n/a | n/a | ⚠ Elevated | | Advance rate (blended) | 112% LTV | stable | n/a | n/a | ✓ In policy | Benchmark: Fitch subprime auto ABS, Jan 2026, NCO 9.81% · 60+ DPD 6.65%. You are roughly at market on the level, and above market on the rate of change. At this slope, your book *breaches its NCO cap in six months.* That puts it in October. 03 · Who is doing the damage Is the whole house on fire, or three rooms? Tool · Dealer Scorecard The question that changes the plan This is the question you ask the second you see the slope: is my whole book deteriorating, or is a handful of dealers dragging the average. Because the answer decides whether you reach for a sledgehammer or a scalpel. So we attribute. Every dealer, ranked by what they are actually costing you, not by volume, by loss and by how early their paper goes bad. | Dealer | Loans | % of book | Net loss | EPD rate | Severe 60+ | Flag | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Dealer N | 92 | 4.6% | 16.4% | 29.3% | 38.1% | Toxic | | Dealer H | 148 | 7.4% | 15.1% | 27.0% | 35.8% | Toxic | | Dealer C | 200 | 10.0% | 14.8% | 27.8% | 34.2% | Toxic | | Dealer F | 118 | 5.9% | 9.4% | 9.1% | 18.3% | Watch | | Dealer M | 95 | 4.8% | 8.8% | 8.4% | 17.1% | Watch | | 13 remaining dealers | 967 | n/a | 5.1% | 6.8% | 13.2% | Clean | 18 dealers total · EPD network median 7.2% · the three toxic dealers run 3.9× the network EPD · HHI 1,840 (moderate concentration) Reading it back to you Three names do almost all of the work: **Dealers C, H, and N.** Together they are 22% of your originations and **51% of your severe delinquency.** Their early-payment-default rate is around 28%, nearly four times your network median. That is the tell. EPD this high means these loans were not good loans that went bad. They were bad the day they were written. Meanwhile your 13 clean dealers are running 5.1% loss, comfortably under market. You do not have a book problem. You have a three-dealer problem hiding inside a book-level average. Twenty-two percent of the book. *Fifty-one percent of the damage.* 04 · When it started The damage has a date stamp. Tool · Vintage Static Pool Why timing matters Knowing who is half the answer. Knowing when tells you whether it is still happening or already behind you. So we line up every origination quarter as its own static pool and watch each one age at the same number of months on book. That strips out the "newer loans look better because they are younger" illusion. | Vintage | Loans | Orig $ | Avg MOB | 60+ DPD | Charged off | Cum net loss | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | 2023 Q1 | 371 | $5.9M | 39 | 6.1% | 9.4% | 9.8% | | 2023 Q2 | 368 | $5.8M | 36 | 6.4% | 8.9% | 9.3% | | 2023 Q3 ▲ | 374 | $5.9M | 33 | 8.8% | 11.2% | 12.4% | | 2023 Q4 ▲ | 369 | $5.8M | 30 | 9.1% | 10.8% | 11.9% | | 2024 Q1 | 377 | $6.0M | 27 | 5.9% | 5.2% | 6.1% | | 2024 Q2 | 141 | $2.1M | 24 | 4.8% | 3.1% | 3.4% | ▲ Flagged cohorts: 2023 Q3 and Q4 exceed 11% cumulative loss at month 30-33, about 1.4× what 2023 Q1-Q2 did at the same seasoning. Common factor underneath: 72-month terms, 8-10 year vehicles, concentrated in Dealers C, H and N. Reading it back to you The break is the **back half of 2023.** Your Q3 and Q4 pools are running 12% cumulative loss at month 30, while your older 2022 and early-2023 paper sat near 9% at the same age. Same dealers underneath, same loan structure. And notice 2024 is already coming in cleaner, that tells me whatever changed in late 2023 has partly self-corrected, but the bad vintage is still on your book bleeding. 05 · Why those loans go bad You didn't underwrite a borrower. You underwrote a car. Tool · Vehicle-to-Term Matcher The mechanism, so you can defend the finding Here is the why, because when the bank asks, you want to say you understand the cause, not just that you spotted the symptom. The flagged paper is **72-month terms on 8 to 10 year old vehicles.** Put the depreciation curve next to the amortization curve and the problem draws itself. Loan balance vs. vehicle value · 72-month term, 9-year-old vehicle (illustrative) Loan balance (72-mo amortization) Vehicle value (depreciation) Where defaults cluster Reading it back to you You advanced above the car's value on day one, that is your 112% blended LTV. On a 9-year-old vehicle the value falls off a cliff while a 72-month note barely moves in the early years. The negative-equity gap is widest right where these loans actually default, **months 18 to 36.** A borrower who hits a bump there cannot sell or refinance their way out, the car is worth thousands less than they owe, so the keys come back instead. The term outran the metal. *The loan runs to 72; the car was gone by 36.* 06 · Where this ends Now we put it on the calendar. Tool · Covenant Breach Projector The part the bank cares about most This is the slide your warehouse bank will care about more than any other, because these are their covenants. I take the slopes we measured and run them to the line. Same math they will run, just earlier. NCO Covenant · Breach projected 6 months Current 9.6% · cap 13.5% · slope +0.65 pp/mo Projected breach: **October 2026** 2 of 6 mo consumed 90+ DPD Trigger · Breach projected 6 months Current 4.2% · trigger 6.0% · slope +0.30 pp/mo Projected breach: **October 2026** 2 of 6 mo consumed FICO Floor · Compliant 14 pt headroom Current 574 · floor 560 · drift −1.2 pts/mo Projected floor: **12 months out** ~2 of 14 pts consumed Post-intervention · NCO slope 18+ months After pausing Dealers C, H, N: slope +0.22 pp/mo Breach pushed beyond 18-month horizon Line preserved Reading it back to you NCO and 90+ DPD both break in **month six. The same month. October.** A breach trips your cash sweep, the sweep halts new originations, and you lose access to the line at the exact moment you would need it to grow out of the problem. Your FICO floor is not the worry. That is a year out. The fourth card is the one I like ending on, because that is this same book after we act. Hold that thought. 07 · The fix A scalpel, not a sledgehammer. Tool · Dealer Scorecard + Underwriting policy Why not just pull back The instinct under covenant pressure is a book-wide pullback, cut everyone. That is the panic move, and it punishes your 13 clean dealers for the sins of three. It also kills the yield you need to recover. Because we attributed the loss to named dealers, we can do something far more precise. Intervention outcome · modelled Pause new originations from **Dealers C, H and N** only. New submissions on hold, existing paper stays on the book under enhanced monitoring. Nothing else changes. The remaining 15 dealers keep funding without interruption. +0.65 → +0.22 Monthly NCO slope ~140 bps Yield recovered ~$1.8M Covenant headroom restored Reading it back to you That one move flattens your slope from 0.65 to 0.22 a month, which pushes the breach from October out past the 18-month horizon. You recover roughly 140 basis points of yield and about 1.8 million of covenant headroom versus the book-wide cut, and your healthy dealers never feel a thing. That fourth covenant card from the last section, the green one, that is this scenario. Three dealers paused. *The line preserved. Fifteen dealers never interrupted.* 08 · What you do Monday Three actions. One is immediate. Output · the page you keep What the analysis points to Here is where the numbers lead. Short enough to act on in a week, documented enough to stand up on a bank's next surveillance call. 1 Immediate · This week Pause new originations from Dealers C, H, and N Notify all three that new submissions are on hold pending performance review. Do not terminate the relationship, existing paper stays in the book under enhanced monitoring. The pause alone flattens your monthly NCO slope to +0.22 pp and removes the October breach risk. Document the decision and the data behind it for the bank's next surveillance call. 2 30 days · Underwriting policy Cap term at 60 months on vehicles aged 8 years or older 72-month terms on 8-10 year vehicles is the structural driver of the 2023-H2 deterioration. The collateral falls below the balance early and stays there through the default window. Capping term at 60 months on this vehicle profile cuts expected loss by roughly 35% on new originations in the segment. Apply it to all dealers, not just the three flagged. 3 Ongoing · Monthly Run the dealer scorecard monthly; watch Dealers F and M Dealers F and M sit above the network median (9.4% and 8.8% loss) but below the toxic threshold. Both bear watching the next two cycles. If either crosses 11% NCO or 20% EPD, apply the same pause protocol. A monthly refresh catches the slope before it ever reaches the aggregate, which is the whole point: you find it here, not on the bank's call. **Method & lineage.** Net loss = (charge-off − recovery) ÷ originated balance, computed per loan and aggregated by vintage and dealer. Vintages group by origination quarter. MOB = months from origination to as-of date (April 30, 2026). 60+ DPD counts loans in 60/90/repo buckets over active loans (paid-off and charged-off excluded from denominator). EPD = first default ≤3 months on book. Covenant slope derived from linear regression over the prior 6 months of monthly NCO readings. Dealer median excludes the top 3 outliers to avoid upward skew. The balance-versus-value chart in section 05 is illustrative of the structure, not a per-loan plot. This was prepared on a synthetic composite portfolio for illustration; the method is the same one a risk desk would apply to a live book. LendRisk Analytics Independent market research the research desk LendRisk Analytics · lendriskanalytics.com Worked Example · May 2026 Synthetic data · Illustrative only The point The aggregate hides the answer. A book like this reads compliant right up until the month it does not. The slope, the three dealers, and the breach date were all sitting inside an average that looked fine. Attribution is what turns a calm snapshot into a decision you can actually make.